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Abstract
Video sharing platforms like YouTube are increasingly tar-
geted by aggression and hate attacks. Prior work has shown
how these attacks often take place as a result of “raids,” i.e.,
organized efforts by ad-hoc mobs coordinating from third-
party communities. Despite the increasing relevance of this
phenomenon, however, online services often lack effective
countermeasures to mitigate it. Unlike well-studied problems
like spam and phishing, coordinated aggressive behavior both
targets and is perpetrated by humans, making defense mecha-
nisms that look for automated activity unsuitable. Therefore,
the de-facto solution is to reactively rely on user reports and
human moderation.
In this paper, we propose an automated solution to identify
YouTube videos that are likely to be targeted by coordinated
harassers from fringe communities like 4chan. First, we char-
acterize and model YouTube videos along several axes (meta-
data, audio transcripts, thumbnails) based on a ground truth
dataset of videos that were targeted by raids. Then, we use
an ensemble of classifiers to determine the likelihood that a
video will be raided with very good results (AUC up to 94%).
Overall, our work provides an important first step towards de-
ploying proactive systems to detect and mitigate coordinated
hate attacks on platforms like YouTube.
1 Introduction
Over the years, the Web has shrunk the world, allowing indi-
viduals to share viewpoints with many more people than they
are able to in real life. At the same time, however, it has also
enabled anti-social and toxic behavior to occur at an unprece-
dented scale. As social interactions increasingly take place
online, cyber-aggression has unfortunately become a press-
ing problem [34]. In particular, coordinated harassment cam-
∗To appear at the 22nd ACM Conference on Computer-Supported
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paigns are more and more frequent, with perpetrators work-
ing together to repeatedly target victims with hateful com-
ments [11, 15, 24]. One example of such behavior is a phe-
nomenon known as raiding, whereby ad-hoc mobs coordinate
on social platforms to organize and orchestrate attacks aimed
to disrupt other platforms and undermine users who advocate
for issues and policies they do not agree with [35, 44].
Abusive activity is generated by humans and not by au-
tomated programs, thus, systems to detect unwanted con-
tent/bots [7, 53, 71] are not easily adapted to this problem.
In fact, Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, recently identified de-
tecting hate speech as one of the most difficult challenges he
is facing [78]. Hence, platforms mostly adopt reactive solu-
tions, letting users report abusive accounts and taking actions
according to terms of services, e.g., blocking or suspending
offenders [43]. However, this approach is inherently slow (as
long as seven years for the Sandy Hook massacre videos [78]),
and limited by biases in the reports and by the resources avail-
able to verify them.
In this paper, we focus on raids against YouTube videos.
We do so for the following reasons: (1) YouTube is one of
the top visited sites worldwide, with more than 1 billion users
and 1 billion hours of videos watched every day1, and (2) it is
plagued by aggressive behavior and extremism [52]. In fact,
previous work [35] has shown that YouTube is the most heav-
ily targeted platform by hateful and alt-right communities, and
in particular 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/). Be-
sides providing a characterization that identifies when a raid
has occurred, however, previous work has not provided solu-
tions to mitigate the problem.
In this paper, we propose a proactive approach towards
curbing coordinated hate attacks against YouTube users.
Rather than looking at attacks as they happen, or at known
abusive accounts, we investigate whether we can automati-
cally identify YouTube videos that are likely to be raided. We
1https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/
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present a system that relies on multiple features of YouTube
videos, such as title, category, thumbnail preview, as well as
audio transcripts, to build a model of the characteristics of
videos that are commonly raided. This also allows us to gain
an understanding of what content attracts raids, i.e., why these
videos are raided.
Our experiments rely on ground truth dataset of 428 raided
YouTube videos obtained from our previous work [35], com-
paring them to 15K regular YouTube videos that were not tar-
geted by raiders. Based on our analysis, we build classification
models to assess, at upload time, whether a video is likely to be
raided in the future. We rely on an ensemble of classifiers, each
looking at a different element of the video (metadata, thumb-
nails, and audio transcripts), and build an ensemble detection
algorithm that performs quite well, reaching AUC values of
up to 94%. Overall, our work provides an important first step
towards curbing raids on video sharing platforms, as we show
how to detect videos targeted by coordinated hate attacks.
In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
1. We analyze and model YouTube raids perpetrated by
users of 4chan, using a ground truth dataset of 428 raided
videos.
2. We build an ensemble classification model geared to
determine the likelihood that a YouTube video will be
raided in the future, using a number of features (video
metadata, audio transcripts, thumbnails). Our system
achieves an AUC of 94% when analyzing raided videos
posted on 4chan with respect to all other non raided
videos in our dataset.
3. We provide concrete suggestions as to how video plat-
forms can deploy our methodology to detect raids and
mitigate their impact.
2 Background & Related Work
Hate attacks on online services can happen in a number of
ways. In this paper, we focus on organized attacks – “raids”
– which are orchestrated by a community and target users
on other platforms [35, 44]. In this section, we provide an
overview of online raids, and describe how fringe communi-
ties organize and orchestrate them. Then, we review relevant
prior work.
2.1 Anatomy of Online Raids
Unlike “typical” attacks on online services, such as denial
of service [64], a raid is an attack on the community that calls
a service home. The goal is not to disrupt the service itself,
but rather to cause chaos and disruption to the users of the
service. As such, online raids are a growing socio-technical
problem. Nonetheless, it is hard to provide a precise definition
of them. In the following, we offer a description of them based
on previous work as well as our own observations of raids in
the wild.
A prototypical raid begins with a user finding a YouTube
video and posting a link to it on a third party community, e.g.,
4chan’s /pol/. In some cases, the original poster, or another
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Figure 1: Distribution of videos from [35], according to the synchro-
nization of their comments with the 4chan thread where the URL was
posted and the number of hate words that appear in the comments.
user, might also write comments like “you know what to do.”
Shortly after, the YouTube video starts receiving a large num-
ber of negative and hateful comments. Overall, raids present
a couple of key characteristics. For instance, they typically
attract a large number of users, joining an effort to explicitly
disrupt any productive/civil discourse that might be occurring.
This is different from what would normally happen with pos-
sibly controversial videos (say, e.g., a video posted by social
justice advocates), which also attract opposing points of view,
though organically. The raid often generates a sudden, unex-
pected attack by uninvolved users.
Another characteristic of raids is their semi-coordinated na-
ture. While a sudden increase in hateful comments to a video
is obvious to an outside observer, what is not obvious is the
fact that these comments are part of a coordinated attack. In
fact, those participating in a raid may even discuss the “fruits
of their labor” on the third party site that they organize on. For
example, as discussed in [35], /pol/ threads serve as an aggre-
gation point for raiders; users will post a hateful comment to
the targeted YouTube video, and then brag about it on /pol/.
This observation led the authors to identify videos that might
have been targeted by a raid by measuring the number of “hate
comments per second” (HCPS), as well as the synchronization
between the comments posted on the YouTube video and those
appearing on the /pol/ thread advocating for a raid.
By correlating the synchronization lag and the HCPS met-
ric, Hine et al. [35] identified a set of videos targeted by raids
during their observation period. This approach was validated
by showing an increase in the overlap of YouTube accounts be-
tween videos as the synchronization lag decreases: the same
accounts were more likely to be involved in the YouTube com-
ments. In other words, it was not random YouTube users leav-
ing hateful comments, but rather “serial” raiders almost as-
suredly originating from /pol/. In Figure 1, we show the dis-
tribution of videos in dataset from [35] according to synchro-
nization lag and HCPS: observe that, the closer the lag is to
zero, the higher rate of hate comments received by the video.
2.2 Related Work
YouTube. YouTube is used every day by millions of individu-
als to share various kinds of videos, e.g., music, lectures, gam-
ing, video blogs, etc. [60]. Organized groups are also active on
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the platform; some use it to reach and grow their network of
support and organize activities, while others to propel radi-
calization and initiatives against other groups. Previous work
has looked at the use of YouTube by LGBT users for self-
disclosure [33], for anti- or pro-anorexia [57], fat stigmatiza-
tion [37], sharing violent content [76], far-right propaganda
[22], as well as Jihad and self-radicalization [16]. These top-
ics often attract considerable attention and typically lead to un-
wanted behavior studied, e.g., in the context of swearing, abu-
sive, hateful, or flaming comments, as well as activity against
the video poster and its supporters [51, 41].
Hate on Social Platforms. Hate has driven many historical
moments in the past. Even by focusing only on what hap-
pened online, researchers have studied hateful content already
in the early 2000s, analyzing chat rooms behavior [30], ex-
tremist websites [28], and blogs [13]. As social networks
became global communities, they also amplified discussions,
creating more controversy and conflict [67]. On social net-
works, hate has been studied mainly by following politics and,
in particular, the analysis of alt-right communities [6, 79] and
populism [27].
Interactions in social communities [80] and between differ-
ent groups [18] often leads to conflicts. In some cases, this
may involve trolling [14, 38] or harassment [74]. Researchers
have overall studied bullying and hate speech on, e.g., Twitter
[9, 11] or Yahoo News and Finance [54]. Also, Salminen et
al. [65] focus on a single target across platforms while Olteanu
et al. [58] look at the hateful speech on Twitter and Reddit in
relation to extremist violence. Mostly, social networks have
reacted to this behavior through bans (e.g., on Reddit [10]) and
blacklisting users (e.g., on Twitter [40]). Whereas, we aim to
build a proactive, rather than reactive, system. Overall, hate
speech detection systems have become a prominent area of re-
search in the last years [23, 68, 49]. By contrast, we focus on
hateful activity against YouTube videos, and in particular on
studying the types of videos that are more likely to be targeted
by attacks.
Cyberbullying & Aggression on YouTube. Prior work has
also studied controversial YouTube videos aiming to under-
stand what types of comments and user reaction certain cat-
egories of videos attract. For instance, Alhabash et al. [4]
measure civic behavioral intention upon exposure to highly or
lowly arousing videos showing cyberbullying activity, while
Lange [47] studies user-posted “ranting” videos, which, al-
though appearing to be aggressive, actually cause subtle differ-
ences in how they engage other users. Recent studies also an-
alyze YouTube videos’ comments to detect hate speech, bully-
ing, and aggression via swearing in political videos. Kwon et
al. [45, 46] investigate whether aggressive behavior (in online
comments) can be contagious, observing mimicry of verbal
aggression via swearing comments against Donald Trump’s
campaign channel. Interestingly, this aggressive emotional
state can lead to contagious effects through textual mimicry. In
this paper, we build on previous work on characterizing raid-
ing behavior on YouTube, presenting a data-driven approach
to identify which videos are likely to be the target of a raid.
Type Source # Videos
Raided 4chan (/pol/) 428
Non-Raided 4chan (/pol/) 789
Random YouTube 14,444
Table 1: Overview of our datasets of YouTube videos. “Source”
denotes the platform from where the link to the YouTube video was
collected.
Detection. Another line of work has looked at offen-
sive/harmful YouTube videos and how to automatically detect
them. This is an orthogonal problem to ours, as we look at
videos posted with a legitimate purpose, that are later victim
of coordinated attacks. Sureka et al. [72] use social network
analysis to identify extremist videos on YouTube, while Ag-
garwal et al. [2] detects violent and abusive videos, by mining
the video’s metadata such as linguistic features in the title and
description, popularity of video, duration and category. Fi-
nally, Agarwal and Sureka [1] search for malicious and hate-
ful videos using a topical crawler, best-first search, and shark-
search for navigating nodes and links on YouTube.
Marathe and Shirsat [50] study detection techniques used
for other problems, e.g., spam detection, and assess whether
they could be applied to bullying detection. Also, Dadvar et
al. [17] use machine learning to detect YouTube users exhibit-
ing cyberbullying behavior. Whereas, rather than focusing on
single offending users, we look at videos that are likely to re-
ceive hate and raids and their attributes from various users.
Finally, Hine et al. [35], as already discussed, show that un-
derground forums such as 4chan organize raids to platforms
like Twitter, Google, and YouTube.
Remarks. In conclusion, to the best of our knowledge, this
work is the first to study video properties, such as their tran-
script, metadata, and thumbnail, to shed light on the charac-
teristics of the videos raided by the users of such platforms,
using advanced machine and deep learning techniques to per-
form detection of videos targeted by raids.
3 Datasets
In this section, we introduce our three datasets used through-
out the paper, as also summarized in Table 1:
1. Videos raided after being posted on /pol/, as identified
by [35];
2. Videos posted on /pol/ which were not raided;
3. Random YouTube videos, which we use to compare
raided videos against.
Raided videos posted on 4chan (ground truth). We start by
collecting a ground truth dataset of raided YouTube videos.
As discussed previously, fringe communities within 4chan are
often responsible for organizing raids against YouTube users
that promote ideas that they do not agree with. Raiders attack
such videos, and being part of a group make them feel autho-
rized to express their point of view by insulting the other users
and disrupting the civil discussion on the topic. Therefore, we
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obtain the dataset of YouTube links posted on 4chan over a
2.5-month period in 2016 (June to mid September) from the
authors of [35]. For our purposes, we want to choose con-
servative thresholds to ensure we only select videos that we
are confident were raided. Thus, based on Figure 1, we select
videos with HCPS > 10−4 and time lag less than a day, re-
sulting in 428 videos (out of 1,217) that were raided. [See Sec-
tion 2.1 for details on the Hate Comments Per Second (HPCS)
metric.] We manually examined this ground truth dataset to
further increase our confidence that they were indeed raided.
Non-raided videos posted on 4chan. Although many
YouTube videos posted on 4chan’s /pol/ are raided, obviously
not all videos posted attract hateful behavior. Figure 1 shows
that videos that have a high lag compared to the thread in
which they are posted are unlikely to see much hateful behav-
ior. To compare the characteristics of these videos to the raided
ones, we build a second dataset with videos that were posted
on 4chan but were not raided. We use conservative thresholds
to ensure that we do not mistakenly included raided videos: to
be part of this set, a video needs to have both a synchronization
lag of more than one day compared to the 4chan thread it was
posted in, and to have a HCPS of 0. These choices leave an
unselected set of videos from the /pol/ database, making our
sets cleaner and more accurate. This yields 789 non-raided
videos.
Random YouTube videos. Finally, in order to draw compar-
isons with the ground truth of raided videos, we need to collect
a set of YouTube videos that are likely not raided (we may re-
fer to them as not raided from now on). We use the YouTube
API and download 50 of the top videos across a variety of cat-
egories. In the end, we collected 14,444 videos, selected fol-
lowing the same distribution of (YouTube) categories as those
linked on /pol/. We downloaded videos during the same time
window as the ones posted on /pol/ to build a random set as
reliable as possible, however, the dynamics of the raids may
force our system to periodically update the training set.
Ethical considerations. Our research protocol received ethics
approval from University College London. We also followed
standard ethical practices to minimize information disclosure
for all datasets, e.g., we discarded any personal information
about the users uploading or commenting on the videos, en-
crypted data at rest, etc.
4 Video Processing and Analysis
We now present the methods used to analyze the characteris-
tics of the YouTube videos in our dataset that received raids.
We look at the metadata of a video, its audio transcript, as
well as the thumbnail preview. We then use the insights de-
rived from this analysis to build a classifier geared to deter-
mine whether a YouTube video is likely to receive a raid.
4.1 Metadata
In addition to the actual videos, we also collect the associ-
ated metadata, specifically: title, duration, category, descrip-
tion, and tags. Except for the duration, these fields are entered
by the user uploading the video. Naturally, title, duration, and
description often play a major role in a user’s decision to watch
the video as they are the first elements that they see. Also,
the tags provide an intuition of a video’s topics, and are actu-
ally also used by YouTube to suggest other videos—in a way,
watching a suggested video might actually trigger a post on
4chan. Looking at the category for videos posted on 4chan,
we anecdotally find that many of them include news, politics,
and ethnic issues.
Evidence of controversial topics. We perform term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) analysis on
the string metadata (title, tags, and description) to extract
information about the most used keywords in the different
groups of videos, finding that random videos often include
“Google,” “music,” and “love” (top 3 used words), as well
as “follow” and “subscribe.” By contrast, all videos posted
on 4chan include politics-related words such as “Hillary” and
“Trump,” or indications of racial content like “black,” while
only raided videos have certain words like “police,” “lives”
(likely related to the Black Lives Matter movement), or “Alex”
(referring to InfoWars’ Alex Jones, a conspiracy theorist, who
is well known in alt-right circles).2
The differences in the topics used in the metadata are ex-
tremely important: search engines are affected by the content
of the metadata, especially tags; moreover YouTube suggests
videos to the user based on many of these fields. Overall, we
observe that random YouTube videos have few topics in com-
mon with the 4chan videos, while there are some similarities
between the set of videos posted on 4chan but not raided and
those that were raided.
4.2 Audio Processing
The process to extract audio from each video involve five
steps. (1) We download YouTube videos in MPEG-4 format.
(2) We extract the corresponding stereo audio channels using
the ffmpeg tool at 44.1KHz sampling rate. (3) Both audio
channels are then mixed and down-sampled to 8KHz, using
the sox utility; aiming to match same acoustic conditions be-
tween the YouTube audio and the training samples employed
to develop the following audio analysis modules. (4) We rely
on Voice Activity Detection (VAD) to discriminate non-speech
audio segments for further processing. (5) We use Automatic
Speech Recognition (ASR) to perform the speech-to-text tran-
scription. Note that previous systems were originally trained
and tuned using conversational telephone speech.
Voice Activity Detection. VAD is often used as an upstream
processing step intended to prevent unwanted data from enter-
ing later stages. The VAD system we use is based on [21] and
uses long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural net-
works. We train and evaluate it using call center audio, 20
hours and 1.4 hours respectively, with error rates ranging from
5% to 8%.
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex Jones
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(a) Non-raided. (b) Non-raided. (c) Raided. (d) Raided.
Figure 2: Sample of thumbnails from our dataset.
Automatic Speech Recognition. We use an ASR system for
English from [48], trained using the Kaldi toolkit [62] and the
Switchboard corpus [31], which includes around 300 hours of
conversational speech. In particular, we adapt the Switchboard
training recipe for nnet2 models from [62], and train two dif-
ferent systems. The first one makes use of GMM/HMM mod-
els and speaker adaptation techniques. It employs triphone
units with a total of 5,500 states and with a final complexity of
90,000 Gaussian mixtures. The second trains a vanilla DNN,
composed of 4 hidden layers with 1,024 neurons each, on top
of the alignments produced from the previous GMM system.
For the language modeling, we estimate a trigram language
model using MIT Language Model Toolkit with Kneser-Ney
Smoothing [36]. No lattice re-scoring is performed. The
pronunciation dictionary, an orthographic/phonetic mapping,
is from CMUdict, an open source pronunciation dictionary.3
The target lexicon accounts for more than 40K words. Note
that neither “bad words” nor slang terms are in the original
Switchboard lexicon. To evaluate the ASR performance, we
use a separated subset of the same Switchboard database ac-
counting for 5 hours of speech. The development results by
the DNN based system, trained using only the Switchboard
dataset, show a 13.05% Word Error Rate (WER). We finally
run the DNN system on the Youtube audio dataset to generate
the 1-best decoding transcription.
Evidence of controversial topics. Similar to what we did
with the metadata, we also analyze the transcribed words to
compare the different datasets. We observe that most YouTube
videos have a lot of verbal communication. Specifically, 86%
of the videos have at least 10 words spoken with the me-
dian and average video transcription containing 317 and 1,200
words respectively. We also look at whether or not some terms
are more prevalent in raided YouTube videos, by averaging
the TF-IDF vectors separately for the two classes (raided and
non-raided videos), and examining the most influential terms.
We find words like “black,” “police,” “white,” “shot,” “world,”
“gun,” “war,” “American,” “government,” and “law” in the top
20 terms in raided videos (in addition to some stop words and
extremely popular terms that were excluded). Of these, the
only word that appears among the top 20 in the non-raided
videos is “government.” The top terms for non-raided videos
are different: they include words like “god,” “fun,” “movie,”
3http://www.speech.cs.cmu.edu/cgi-bin/cmudict
and “love.”
4.3 Thumbnails
On YouTube, each video is also represented by an image
thumbnail, used, e.g., in search results. Thumbnails provide
viewers with a quick snapshot of the content of each video.
Although users can manually select them, by default, thumb-
nails are automatically selected from the video and the user
can choose one of three suggested options.
Using the YouTube API, we extract all available thumbnails
from the videos in our dataset—specifically, using a combina-
tion of image recognition and content extraction tools (see be-
low). Note that thumbnails are not always available to down-
load. In a few cases, this happens because the videos is not
accessible via the API when gathering the thumbnails (which
was done separately from the video itself, comments, and
metadata), but, mostly, because the thumbnail was not been
properly uploaded and is inaccessible even though the video is
still available.
Image recognition. To extract meaningful information from
the thumbnails, we use deep neural networks [42, 73]. A large
corpus of images can be used to train a deep neural network:
each image is annotated with visible context that is used as
ground truth, and the resulting network can then recognize ob-
jects appearing in the images and generate an accurate descrip-
tion of them.
Context extraction. For each thumbnail, we then output a
description that represents the semantics involved in the im-
age. Figure 2 shows images from four examples of different
thumbnails, two in the raided category and two in the non-
raided category. The following descriptions have been auto-
matically inferred from each of the images: (a) a white plate
topped with a pile of food, (b) a couple of women standing
next to each other, (c) a man in a suit and tie standing in front
of a TV, and (d) a woman sitting in front of a laptop computer.
Note that each caption extracted not only identifies the main
actor within the picture (a plate, a couple of women, or a man),
but also the background activity. However, these descriptions
are automatically inferred based on a model bounded by the
objects in the training images-set, thus, there might be misin-
terpretations.
Evidence of controversial topics. We use topic-modeling to
abstract the descriptions obtained from the images using Con-
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Figure 3: Architecture of our proactive detection system.
Type Non-Raided Raided Diff.
Clothing 25.5% 33.4% 7.9%
Male-Gender 52.4% 59.1% 6.7%
Device 44.3% 50.7% 6.4%
Vehicle 8.9% 12.4% 3.4%
Animal 9.2% 5.8% 3.4%
Sport 22.6% 20.3% 2.2%
Color 12.5% 10.7% 1.8%
Joy 1.6% 2.8% 1.2%
Culture 1.6% 0.7% 0.9%
Food 2.4% 1.6% 0.8%
Female-Gender 9.8% 10.3% 0.5%
Nature 6.8% 6.8% 0.1%
Table 2: Topics found across videos with thumbnails.
ceptNet [69]. In particular, we extract categories related to
sports, joy, underage, gender, etc. For example, some of the
words in the joy category are “happy,” “smile,” “wedding,” or
“Christmas.” Table 2 shows a summary of the prevalence of
words related to any of these categories across videos in our
dataset. We observe that there are a number of common top-
ics displayed across both classes (e.g., nature). Likewise, fe-
male gender references are almost equal in both classes, with a
slight bias towards raid videos. Interestingly, the case of male
gender references is clearly biased towards raided videos, with
males appearing in about 52% of the non-raided videos and
in 59% of the raided ones. Reference to clothes (e.g., “tie”,
“dress”, “jacket”, “uniform”) is the most distinctive category
with a 7.9% difference between each class.
This indicates that there are a number of thumbnails whose
context can be used to characterize videos that could poten-
tially be raided. However, numbers also indicate that thumb-
nails alone might not be able to fully model the differences
between the two classes. Our intuition at this point is that
thumbnails can contribute towards the classification decisions,
but they will not outperform other feature sets. While an ex-
ploratory analysis such as the one presented in this section can
provide a general impression of the choice of models, it is hard
to know upfront which model will better capture features sin-
gling out hate attacks. Extensive research work has covered
the benefits of combining together different models [66]. Hav-
ing different feature sets is generally the main reason for using
a combination of classifiers. This is because different classi-
fication methods might perform better with a specific sub-set
of features [39]. However, as pointed out in [66], there is no
definitive taxonomy of combined learning; thus, an empirical
comparison is paramount to determine the relative benefits and
drawbacks in our domain.
5 Proactive Detection
We now introduce our approach to provide a proactive detec-
tion tool for videos targeted by hate attacks on online services,
and on YouTube in particular. Our goal is to systematize this
task, relying on a set of machine learning classifiers, each of
which focuses on a different set of features extracted from on-
line videos. Overall, we detail the set of features we use, mo-
tivated by the findings reported in the previous section.
5.1 Overview
A high-level description of our detection system is pre-
sented in Figure 3. The system is first trained using the dataset
videos as explained earlier.
(1) A set of prediction models C={C1, . . . , Ci } that output
a probability Ci(σ1, . . . , σn)=Pi[Y=raid|(σ1, . . . , σn)] of
each video Y being raided given a feature vector (σ1, . . . , σn)
obtained from different elements i of the video. These models
are referred to as individual classifiers.
(2) A weighted model f(C) = ∑wi · Ci that combines all
predictions in C, where each of the classifiers Ci is weighted
by wi based on the performance obtained on a validation set.
This set is different from the training set (used to build the
individual probabilities) and the testing set (used to measure
the efficacy of the classifiers). The process of weighting the
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individual predictors also serves as a way to calibrate the out-
put of the probabilities. The final classifier will then output a
decision based on its voting algorithm.
To ease presentation, we refer to the model presented in
(2) as weighted-vote. One can simplify the model by giving
equal weight to all wi (typically wi = 1) and obtaining a nom-
inal value for Ci before voting. In other words, applying a
threshold for each Ci (e.g., 0.5) and creating an equal vote
among participants. We refer to this non-weighted voting sys-
tem as majority-vote. One can further simplify the scheme
by combining each individual prediction using the arithmetic
mean of the output the probabilities—this is known as an
average-prediction system.
Note that the parameters (i.e., wi, , and the thresholds for
deciding the class in each Ci) used in both majority-vote and
average-prediction are fixed and do not require calibration.
Thus, the validation set is not used in these two modes.
5.2 Feature Engineering
In the following, we discuss how we create the features vec-
tors used by the different classifiers. Our system extracts fea-
tures from three different sources: (1) structured attributes of
the metadata of the video, (2) features extracted from raw au-
dio, and (3) features extracted from raw images (thumbnails).
Based on the preprocessing described earlier, we transform
non-textual elements of a video (i.e., audio and images) into
a text representation. Other textual elements such as the title
of the video and the tags are kept as text. These textual rep-
resentations are then transformed into a fixed-size input space
vector of categorical features. This is done by tokenizing the
input text to obtain a nominal discrete representation of the
words described on it. Thus, feature vectors will have a lim-
ited number of possible values given by the bag of words rep-
resenting the corpus in the training set. When extracting fea-
tures from the text, we count the frequency with which a word
appears in the text.
Since in large text corpus certain words–e.g., articles–
can appear rather frequently without carrying meaningful in-
formation, we transform occurrences into a score based on
two relative frequencies known as term-frequency and in-
verse document-frequency (TF-IDFs). Intuitively, the term
frequency represents how “popular” a word is in a text (in
the feature vector), and the inverse document-frequency repre-
sents how “popular” a word appears, provided that it does not
appear very frequently in the corpus (the feature space). More
formally, we compute as idf(t) = log 1+ns1+df(s,t) + 1, where ns
is the total number of samples and df(s, t) is the number of
samples containing term t.
As for the thumbnails, after extracting the most represen-
tative descriptions per image, we remove the least informa-
tive elements and only retain entities (nouns), actions (verbs),
and modifiers (adverbs and adjectives). Each element in the
caption is processed to a common base to reduce inflectional
forms and derived forms (known as stemming). Further, we
abstract the descriptions obtained from the images using topic-
modeling as described earlier.
In our implementation, we extract features only from the
thumbnail of a video. Again, this is mainly because the thumb-
nails are purposely selected to and encapsulate semantically
relevant context. However, we emphasize that our architecture
could support the extraction of features from every frame in
the video.
5.3 Prediction Models
We use three independent classifiers to estimate the like-
lihood of a video being targeted by hate attacks. These are
built to operate independently, possibly when a new video is
uploaded. In particular, each classifier is designed to model
traits from different aspects of the video. Available decisions
are later combined to provide one unified output.
We use three different classifiers, in an ensemble, because
features obtained from different parts of a video are inherently
incomplete, as some fields are optional and others might not
be meaningful for certain video. For instance, a music video
might not report a lengthy transcript, or a thumbnail might not
contain distinguishable context. Since any reliable decision
system should be able to deal with incomplete data, ensem-
ble methods are well-suited to this setting. Moreover, ensem-
bles often perform better than single classifiers overall [20].
The goal of each classifier is to extrapolate those controversial
characteristics that, if present, are making the video likely to
be raided.
5.3.1 Metadata and thumbnail classifiers
We build a prediction model such that Pi(Y = raid) based
on the features extracted from the metadata (PM ) and from
the image thumbnails (PI ). The architecture of these two
predictors is flexible and accepts a range of classifiers. Our
current implementation supports Random Forests (RFs), Extra
Randomized Trees (XTREEs), and Support Vector Machines
(SVM), both radial and linear. We opt for RF as the base clas-
sifier for PT and SVM with linear kernel for PM . Both SVM
and RF have been successfully applied to different aspects of
security in the past (e.g., fraud detection [8]) and have been
shown to outperform other classifiers (when compared to 180
classifiers used for real-world problems [26]).
5.3.2 Audio-transcript classifier
Before feeding the transcripts to the classifier, we remove
words that have a transcription confidence ptrans<0.5, as they
are likely incorrectly transcribed (including them only con-
fuses the classifier). Note that this only removes 9.2% of tran-
scribed words. Additionally, we remove repeated terms that
are mostly exclamations such as “uh uh” or “hm hm”. Fi-
nally, the transcripts contain tags for non-verbal communica-
tion such as noise, laughter, etc., which we leave in the text as
they do carry predictive power. We tried classifying using tra-
ditional TF-IDF based approaches, Convolutional Networks,
and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), ultimately opting for
the latter since it yields the best performance and is quite ef-
fective at understanding sequences of words and interpreting
the overall context. We also use an attention mechanism [5]
that helps RNNs “focus” on word sequences that might indi-
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cate potentially raided videos. We also use GloVe to embed
words into 200-dimensional vectors as we have relatively few
training examples.
5.3.3 Ensemble classifier
The objective of the ensemble method is to aggregate the
predictions of the different base estimators. Each classifier
individually models the likelihood that a video will be be tar-
geted by hate attacks based on its set of features. The en-
semble combines these decisions to make a more informed
prediction. This allows for more robust predictions (in terms
of confidence) and can result in a more accurate prediction.
Our classifier is a stacking ensemble architecture, known to
perform better than individual classifiers [77]. This architec-
ture has been successfully used in other classification fields,
for instance, credit scoring [75] and sentiment analysis [3].
We design our ensemble method to take a weighted vote of
the available predictions. To compute the best-performing
set of weights, we estimate a function f that takes as input
each of the individual probabilities and outputs the aggre-
gated prediction. During training this function learns from
an independent testing set, and will be used during testing to
weight each prediction model Pi. Formally, f(PM , PI , PT ) =
{raid,non-raid}.
For the decision function f of our weighted-vote algorithm
(see the overview paragraphs at the beginning of this section),
we use a distribution function that models how an expected
probability in the testing set is affected by individual decisions
Pi in a multiple regression.
In our implementations, we use different underlying clas-
sification algorithms for estimating f . However, in the next
section, we only present the results for each of the individual
classifiers and two ensemble methods, namely, weighted-vote,
and average-prediction. For the former, weights are fit using
XTREE [29]. For the latter, we also test different settings. In
particular, we try settings where one of the classifiers is given
a fixed weight of w = 0 and we average the others.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we present the setup and the results of our ex-
perimental evaluation.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We aim to show that we can distinguish between raided and
non-raided videos. However, there are several subtasks we
also want to evaluate, aiming to better characterize the prob-
lem and understand how our classifiers perform.
Experiments. We start by trying to distinguish between ran-
dom YouTube videos and those that are linked from /pol/.
Next, we distinguish between the videos that are raided and
those that are not (whether posted on /pol/ or not). Finally, we
predict whether videos posted on 4chan will be raided.
More specifically, in EXPERIMENT 1, we test if our classi-
fiers are able to distinguish between videos linked from /pol/
and a random video uploaded to YouTube, aiming to gather
insight into the ability to discriminate between videos poten-
tially raided vs. those that are not at risk at all. Then, EXPERI-
MENT 2 evaluates whether or not the classifier can distinguish
between any non-raided video (i.e., regardless of whether it is
a random YouTube video or one posted on 4chan) and videos
that will be raided. Finally, in EXPERIMENT 3, we focus on
videos posted on 4chan, and determine which are going to be
raided and which are not; this ensures that we can not only
predict whether a video was posted on 4chan, but whether or
not the video will be raided.
Train, Test, and Validate Splits. We split our datasets into
three chunks: two for training and tuning parameters of the
ensemble (training and validation) and one for testing, and re-
port performance metrics on the latter. As we are dealing with
highly unbalanced classes (there are multiple orders of mag-
nitude more videos posted to YouTube than those posted to
4chan, let alone those that are raided), we balance the training
and validation sets to model both classes properly, but leave
the test set unbalanced. We have tried to train and tune the
classifiers using unbalanced sets, but preliminary results have
shown that this setup does not allow an accurate classification.
This setup underperforms by at least 0.12 AUC in all the dif-
ferent experiments compared to the results we had by training
and tuning on balanced sets. The test set, however, remains un-
balanced to more realistically model the ratio of raided videos
against non raided videos in the wild.
The total number of videos in each split is proportion-
ally sampled depending on the less populated class, assigning
splits of 60%, 20%, and 20% to the training, validation, and
test sets. The more populated class uses the same amount of
samples for training and validation, while it will have all the
remaining samples in the test set. This procedure is repeated
ten times and the results are averaged over the ten different
rounds. We decided to use random sampling for the training
set, rather than a stratified sampling based on the categories of
the videos as we believe this allows us to present results from
a worst-case scenario: training videos may not fully represent
test videos and, as consequence, our classifiers may perform
slightly worse. Table 3 summarizes all settings in our experi-
ments, along with the number of samples used.
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate our system using precision,
recall, and F1-measure. Overall, these metrics are a good sum-
mary of the performance of an classifier in terms of True Neg-
atives (TN), False Negatives (FN), False Positives (FP), and
True Positives (TP); however, they are not ideal for compar-
ing results across different experiments. Therefore, we also
plot the Area Under Curve (AUC), which reports the TP-rate
(recall) against the FP-rate (1 - recall).
6.2 Experimental Results
We now report the results of our experimental evaluations,
as per the settings introduced above. To ease presentation, we
only report metrics for the individual classifiers as well as two
ensemble methods: weighted-vote and average-prediction.
We do not report results for other ensemble classifiers (simple-
voting and the other underlying algorithms for estimating the
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ID Description Training Validation Test
EXPERIMENT 1 Random YouTube vs. all on 4chan 731+731 243+243 13,470+244
EXPERIMENT 2 All non-raided vs. raided on 4chan 258+258 85+85 14,890+85
EXPERIMENT 3 Non-raided on 4chan vs. raided on 4chan 258+258 85+85 446+85
Table 3: Number of samples used in our experiments. The sets are balanced as there is the same amount of samples per each class (class 1
samples+class 2 samples) in training and validation, while they are unbalanced in the test set.
EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3
Classifier PRE REC F1 AUC PRE REC F1 AUC PRE REC F1 AUC
transcripts 0.05 0.60 0.10 0.79 0.03 0.56 0.06 0.79 0.32 0.58 0.40 0.73
metadata 0.13 0.89 0.23 0.96 0.03 0.85 0.06 0.94 0.32 0.71 0.44 0.79
thumbnails 0.02 0.64 0.05 0.62 0.01 0.66 0.02 0.61 0.18 0.55 0.27 0.56
weighted-vote ensemble 0.12 0.91 0.21 0.96 0.03 0.88 0.05 0.94 0.34 0.69 0.45 0.80
average-prediction ensemble 0.15 0.85 0.26 0.96 0.04 0.82 0.07 0.94 0.35 0.69 0.46 0.80
Table 4: Results for EXPERIMENT 1, EXPERIMENT 2, and EXPERIMENT 3. PRE stands for precision, and REC for recall. The ensemble
classifiers have different inputs: the weighted-vote classifier receives inputs from all three the individual ones, while the average-prediction
does not receive the thumbnail classifier input.
weights), since they under-perform in our experiments. For
weighted-vote, weights are fit using XTREE [29], as described
earlier. Also note that, for average-prediction, we find that the
thumbnails classifier tends to disagree with the metadata and
the transcripts classifiers combined. Therefore, for average-
prediction, we fix a weight of w = 0 for the thumbnails clas-
sifier (i.e., wthumbnail = 0).
Experiment 1. In this experiment we study whether we can
predict that a video is linked from 4chan. Results are reported
in Table 4. Since we are dealing with a rather unbalanced val-
idation set (in favor of the negative class), it is not surprising
that precision drops to values close to 0 even though we main-
tain high recall.
Looking at the results obtained by the individual classifiers,
the weighted-vote ensemble classifier matched the best recall
from the metadata individual classifier (0.91). The model re-
lied almost entirely on the metadata classifier (weight equal to
0.987) while assigning very low weights to transcripts (0.007)
and thumbnails (0.006). The best AUC is the same between
the metadata classifier and the two ensemble classifiers (0.96).
In Figure 4a, we also plot the ROC curve for all five clas-
sifiers. The individual AUC scores are 0.79, 0.96, 0.62 for
the transcripts, metadata, and thumbnails, respectively, while
the two ensembles (weighted-vote and average-prediction)
score 0.96. The weighted-vote ensemble has the highest AUC
throughout most of the x-axis, although, the ROC curve es-
sentially overlaps with that of the metadata classifier. The
two ensembles have different strengths: the weighted-vote has
the highest recall and AUC values, but the average-prediction
(with wthumbnail = 0) has highest precision, and F1-measure.
Experiment 2. In Figure 4b, we report the AUC when clas-
sifying raided and non-raided videos—regardless of whether
the latter are random YouTube videos or non-raided ones
posted on 4chan. Unlike EXPERIMENT 1, among the in-
dividual classifiers, the best performance is achieved by the
audio-transcript classifier, except for recall. This setting
also yields high recall (0.88) when combining all classifiers
into the weighted-vote ensemble. As in EXPERIMENT 1,
the weighted-vote ensemble presents the highest recall and
AUC, but the average-prediction has higher precision, and
F1-measure. Once again, the model relied almost entirely on
the metadata classifier (weight equal to 0.984) while assign-
ing very low weights to transcripts (0.008) and thumbnails
(0.008). Figure 4b shows a similar situation as in the previ-
ous experiment: the ROC curve for the metadata classifier is
really close to or overlapping with the ones for the two ensem-
ble. AUC equals to 0.61 for thumbnails, 0.79 for transcripts,
and 0.94 for metadata. Whereas, the two ensemble classifiers
achieve 0.94 AUC as the metadata individual classifier
Experiment 3. Finally, we evaluate how well our models
discriminate between raided videos posted to 4chan and non-
raided videos also posted to 4chan. Our results confirm that
this is indeed the most challenging task. Intuitively, these
videos are much more similar to each other than those found
randomly on YouTube as /pol/ is interested in a particular type
of content.
This setting shows a clear case for the ensemble classifica-
tion yielding appreciably better performance. Overall, the in-
dividual classifiers, i.e., transcripts, metadata, and thumbnails,
reach AUCs of 0.73, 0.79, and 0.56, respectively, whereas,
both the ensemble classifiers reach 0.80. Nevertheless, the
ROC curve in Figure 4c shows how the weighted-vote ensem-
ble is sometimes penalized by the weakest performing clas-
sifier (i.e., thumbnails classifier). This is apparent by com-
paring the weighted-vote and average-prediction (recall that
wthumbnails = 0 in the latter). The weights assigned by the
model confirm this: the metadata classifier’s weight is 0.868,
while the weight for transcripts is 0.034 and the one for thumb-
nails is 0.098. As expected, the metadata has a very impor-
tant weight (although not as high as in the previous experi-
ments), surprisingly, the thumbnails have a higher weight than
the transcripts. This means that the transcripts classifier tend
to agree with the metadata one in most of the cases they cor-
rectly flag the videos, while the thumbnails classifier identifies
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Figure 4: ROC curves for each experiment. AUC values for Thumbnails, Transcripts, Metadata, and Ensemble classifiers, XTREE, and
Average probabilities. This metric provides a fair comparison across experiments.
correctly some videos when the other classifiers fail.
6.3 Choosing an Ensemble
The goal of the our system is to make the best final “deci-
sion” possible given the choices made by the individual clas-
sifiers. In absolute terms, the weighted-vote (with XTREE as
baseline estimator) yields the best performance in all three ex-
periments in terms of recall (and overall AUC). In particular,
it outperforms the average-prediction ensemble in two of the
tasks: modeling videos from /pol/ (EXPERIMENT 1), and de-
tecting raided videos in general (EXPERIMENT 2). When re-
stricting our attention to the detection of raids of videos posted
on 4chan (EXPERIMENT 3), both ensemble methods are com-
parable in terms of recall. However, when looking at preci-
sion, we find that average-prediction outperforms weighted-
vote. The trade-off between having good precision and good
recall will have an important impact on the amount of vetting
work required by providers deploying our system, as we dis-
cuss in more detail in Section 7.
In the following, we provide an explanation as to why the
two ensemble classifiers report similar results in some exper-
iments and different ones in others. When using a base esti-
mator to fit the best weights for the individual classifiers, we
observe a bias towards the decisions made by the metadata
classifier. This is expected, as this classifier is the one that
performs best among the individual classifiers (and substan-
tially so in both EXPERIMENT 1 and EXPERIMENT 2). On the
contrary, the thumbnails classifier performs worst, except for
recall in EXPERIMENT 2.
Note that our data include videos with partially-available
features. When this happens, the ensemble classifier is forced
to make a decision based on the other inputs. It is the thumb-
nails case, which are not always available. This is why we
evaluated the average-prediction ensemble method forcing a
weight wthumbnails = 0. In this setting, the weighted-vote
method with XTREE provided similar results, since XTREE
initially assigned a low weight (although not exactly 0) to the
thumbnails.
Overall, with the average-prediction method, precision, and
F1-measure are always better than for the XTREE ensem-
ble classifiers. This means that this configuration reduces the
number of false positives and, as a consequence, is slightly
more accurate. Therefore, when the individual classifiers have
similar performance, the ensemble is better than the best op-
tions among the single classifiers.
7 Discussion
Our experiments show that we can model YouTube videos and
predict those likely to be raided by off-platform communities.
In other words, our results indicate that it is possible to de-
velop automated techniques to mitigate, and possibly prevent,
the socio-technical problem of online attacks and harassment.
What still needs to be ironed out is how our techniques could
be integrated and deployed by online services like YouTube.
Although devising a path to adoption is beyond the scope of
this paper, we discuss this aspect later in this section.
Data collection. The data collection involved in this work
presented a variety of challenges. For example, how can we
be sure that the HCPS metric is effective in identifying hateful
comments? How do we know that non raided videos on /pol/
or random videos are not False Negative cases? How can we
ensure that videos are actually random to a reasonable extent?
Balancing these questions while aiming to support large-scale,
automated analysis thus played a large role in our design deci-
sions.
The use of HCPS and time lag metrics from [35] allowed
us to evaluate the system on ground-truth videos that were
already discovered by previous work. Unfortunately, as ex-
pected, some of these videos were quite popular, with an ex-
tremely large number of comments making manual checking
not viable. Conversely, using automatically quantified met-
rics may result in assigning the wrong class to a video (e.g.,
HCPS may not identify hateful comments in a specific video).
To mitigate this issue, we took a conservative approach, con-
straining our dataset to videos that, e.g., had a minimum HCPS
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and a time lag of less than a day. While this does leave ques-
tions about “borderline” cases, it also results in less ambiguity
surrounding our ground truth.
Also note that the random videos dataset was collected by
category, aiming to reproduce the same distribution of cate-
gories as our ground truth. As YouTube does not provide de-
tailed statistics on the overall distribution of videos, we opted
to shape our negative class following the worst possible case:
an exact copy of the /pol/ distribution. That is, our nega-
tive class comprises videos that (at least in terms of category)
/pol/ might find “interesting.” Further, collecting the negative
dataset via API queries removes additional concerns about hu-
man decisions influencing its composition. A limitation of this
approach is that, by relying on /pol/ videos and the HCPS data
from previous work, we were not able to apply the algorithm
to the random videos. However, such limitation may only have
negative effects on our results, meaning that our experiments
yielded a lower bound on the system efficiency.
Evaluation. Our evaluation shows that we can reliably distin-
guish videos that are likely to be raided from regular YouTube
videos. This means that YouTube could run our system at
upload time, determining the likelihood that a video will be
raided at some point in the future. The platform could then
adopt mitigation strategies for “risky” videos, e.g., by man-
ually moderating comments. This is a practice already em-
ployed by YouTube [61], however, at the moment, the efficacy
of this moderation has been questioned due to the sheer vol-
ume of content, in addition to YouTube’s focus on removing
inappropriate videos rather than protecting users against raids.
Using our system, we estimate that only 16% of videos
would require any action—an estimation based on EXPERI-
MENT 2. While this might appear to be a very large number,
it is still less than having to monitor all videos. Moreover, ad-
ditional automated tools could be deployed to check whether
a raid is actually occurring before being passed along for hu-
man review. Furthermore, YouTube has pledged to hire 10,000
new workers to monitor content about a year ago [25], but
deploying our system could reduce the need for this human
workforce, or at worst, allow them to focus on higher impact
content.
In addition, EXPERIMENT 3 demonstrates that, when pro-
vided with videos linked from fringe communities such as
/pol/, our system can successfully identify videos likely to be
raided with reasonable accuracy. This is a much more difficult
task, and thus the correct detections are less than before, since
videos are very often being posted to /pol/ without the actual
intent of having raiders show up in the first place. Further-
more, the number of videos posted on /pol/ is much smaller
than those uploaded to YouTube overall—for instance, the
/pol/ dataset from [35] contains links to 93k YouTube videos
posted over 3 months. Among these, we only selected those
that had clear evidence of raids by restricting the thresholds of
HCPS and time lag (see Section 2.1), also discarding videos
which could have been raided from the non-raided group. This
choice is extremely conservative (yielding 428 videos), aim-
ing to have a reliable ground truth on which to evaluate the
system. Although we could have relaxed our thresholds and
obtained better results overall, the applicability to real-world
use cases would likely have been affected, as our ground truth
dataset would have included videos that had controversial or
combative statements, but were not actually raided.
Adoption. Our system is really geared to identify videos that
are at risk of being raided, thus, YouTube could use it as a
filter — flagging videos that are risky and/or might require
particular attention. We emphasize that an automated sys-
tem such as the one presented in this paper inherits classical
machine-learning limitations, e.g., dealing with misclassifica-
tions. However, the threshold for what is considered action-
able can be tuned, since in the end the classifiers output a
probability as opposed to a purely binary classification. In
other words, a deployed system could be adjusted to focus on
minimizing false negatives (i.e., videos that will be raided but
are misclassified by the system) while still maintaining high
recall. Tuning the model to balance the overall number of
flagged videos as well as ensuring that they are indeed at high
risk can help reduce the impact of false positives. Given that
our datasets are extremely unbalanced, high precision, on the
other hand, is not a top priority. As mentioned above, the
system would flag videos likely to be raided, thus, helping
to tackle the problem of aggression by reducing the videos
that need to be monitored as high risk ones. Overall, we en-
vision the system not as an end-all be-all solution, but as an
early warning system, enhancing other mechanisms the plat-
form decides to put in place At minimum, e.g., allowing them
to focus human efforts (content moderators etc.) their efforts
where abusers are most likely to attack. While this would cer-
tainly reduce the amount of human labor involved in dealing
with raids, it could also be used to focus more expensive al-
gorithmic systems on high risk videos. E.g., by introducing a
post-prediction system leveraging the HCPS metric discussed
earlier (c.f. Section 2.1) as well as other existing mechanisms
to flag offending comments [12].
Limitations. As mentioned previously, our data collection at-
tempted to minimize the mislabeling of videos linked on /pol/.
This approach allowed us to be reasonably confident that the
raided videos dataset contained only videos attacked by the
/pol/ community. However, these constraints limited the size
of our dataset (out of the more than 5, 000 videos linked on
/pol/ we considered only 428 videos as having been raided).
This relatively small dataset was a limiting factor in the per-
formance of our classifiers.
Moreover, we assume that negative class dataset does not
contain mislabeled samples. The assumption may not hold up
100% of the time since labeling errors occur with both manual
and automatic checks. That said, while mislabeling in our neg-
ative class dataset might affect classifier performance to some
degree, the overall validity of our system is not affected.
Also note that /pol/, though a very good example of a tight-
knit community used to coordinate and disrupt other social
groups, is not the only community responsible for performing
raids against YouTube videos. Other Web communities, e.g,.
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Reddit [63] or Kiwi Farms4 also regularly take part in raiding
activity. The same techniques presented here, however, can be
used to detect raids from other communities.
Raids and communities. Finally, it might be tempting to dis-
miss the relatively low occurrence of raids, vis-a`-vis the num-
ber of YouTube videos posted every day, as being a niche prob-
lem. On the contrary, harassment and bullying on YouTube are
widely recognized as a serious issue by authorities on the mat-
ter [55], and news reports are filled with ghastly stories [59]
and advice on how to deal with hateful and harassing YouTube
comments in particular [19, 32].
Although we are not aware of any suicide cases directly
linked to YouTube raids, victims have indeed been active on
YouTube [56] and thus raids pose very serious safety risks.
Overall, even if the majority of content on YouTube (and other
social media platforms) tends to be “safe,” we should not dis-
card the outsized effects that this negative behavior has. From
a purely pragmatic point of view, advertisers providing the
primary income stream for sites like YouTube have been re-
thinking their reliance on social media in light of the recent
surge in anti-social behavior [70]. From a societal point of
view, raiding behavior is a pressing concern; it is a direct threat
to free speech and civil discourse, and causes emotional dis-
tress that can lead to dire consequences. The efforts of the
research community have enabled the long tail of the Web to
succeed, building technologies that democratized information
and shrunk the world. Thus, while raids on YouTube videos do
occur in the long tail, we argue that dismissing them as being
too rare is an abdication of our social responsibility.
8 Conclusion
This paper presented a supervised learning based approach to
automatically determine whether a YouTube video is likely to
be “raided,” i.e., receive a sudden spike in hateful comments
as a result of an orchestrated effort coordinated from another
platform. Our experimental results showed that even single-
input classifiers that use metadata, thumbnails, or audio tran-
scripts can be effective, and that an ensemble of classifiers can
reach high detection performance, thus providing a deployable
early-warning system.
Overall, our work represents an important first step toward
providing video platforms like YouTube with proactive sys-
tems geared to detect and mitigate coordinated hate attacks.
We discussed potential deployment strategies that could be
taken by YouTube (or other providers), i.e., running our tool
on every video at upload time and/or monitoring fringe com-
munities such as 4chan to screen videos that are linked to on
those platforms.
Note that the classifiers presented in this paper are not meant
to provide a mechanism for censoring content or users, nor to
identify users possibly involved in raids. Rather, we aim to
identify content that is at risk of attack; once identified, proac-
tive solutions to protect against raiders can be taken by the
4https://kiwifarms.net/
service providers. While the specifics are beyond the purpose
of this paper, we believe that there are actions that can be taken
that protect freedom of expression while also preserving civil
discourse. For example, temporarily disabling or rate limit-
ing comments, requiring new comments to be approved before
going live, or simply notifying the poster that a raid might be
coming could serve to balance protection vs. expression.
As part of future work, we plan to use rank aggregation
techniques as ensemble, as well as deep-learning methods to
fuse audio, video, and metadata into a single classifier. This
design follows a different approach with respect to the cur-
rent one. It needs more data (and as consequence more time
and computational resources for training) than the amount of
raided videos we currently have, but, as it can manage the rela-
tions among the different features types, it is likely to have bet-
ter performances once trained properly. We also plan to look
into raids from other communities, such as Reddit, Gab.ai, and
Kiwi Farms.
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